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ARTICLE 
Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of 
the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, 
and the Future of Financial Reform 
GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG & ANDREW VERSTEIN* 
For the last twenty years, the dominant narrative of the over-the-counter 
derivatives market has been one of absent regulation, deregulation, and 
regulatory conflict, predictably resulting in disaster. This Article challenges this 
narrative, arguing that the global derivatives market has been subject to 
pervasive and harmonized regulation by what should be recognized as 
transnational private regulators. Recognizing the reality of widespread 
transnational private regulation of derivatives has significant implications, which 
this Article explores. Appreciating the actual regulatory status quo is essential 
if policymakers are to correctly diagnose problems, avoid past regulatory errors, 
and plan effective remedies. There are also advantages to relying on private 
transnational regulation, as increased governmental effort to regulate the OTC 
derivatives space may undermine and fracture existing regulation. To be sure, 
private transnational regulation carries risks that have sometimes materialized, 
such as the manipulation of LIBOR. Thus, this Article also evaluates best 
practices in regulating through transnational private governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a consensus that in order to avoid the mistakes that 
precipitated the global financial crisis, new and internationally coordinated 
regulatory solutions are needed.1 Indeed, both proposals and recently 
enacted legislation have already dramatically altered the regulatory 
requirements for major commercial and investment banks, as well as 
targeted the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, which have been 
viewed as a key causal factor in the crisis.2 The narrative for the OTC 
derivatives market has almost uniformly been described in the following 
manner: for the last twenty years it was a largely unregulated market, and 
this lack of regulation was key to the role OTC derivatives played in 
causally contributing to the financial crisis and subsequent market woes. In 
brief, OTC derivatives were deregulated and this led to disaster — or so 
the story goes.  
This narrative, however, is incorrect and dangerously so. We dedicate 
the first part of this Article to demonstrating why. The basic contours of 
this argument have been noted by other derivatives scholars in recent 
work. Far from being unregulated, the OTC derivatives market was subject 
to pervasive regulation and governance, although by transnational private 
regulators rather than government. Most prominently, these private 
1. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
2. See infra notes 37, 39.
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regulators have been the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) and the British Bankers’ Association (BBA). Indeed, we argue that 
the U.S. and U.K. governments are best understood as having consciously 
chosen to regulate the OTC derivatives through reliance on transnational 
private regulation.  
We join with other scholars of the OTC derivatives market in finding it 
crucial to appreciate the significance of its underlying transnational private 
regulatory structure. But we go further in asking about the implications of 
understanding the underlying regulatory structure of the OTC derivatives 
market. This Article is about assessing these implications — for 
harmonization, reform, and responsibility — of taking transnational 
private regulation seriously. We make a series of arguments concerning 
lessons to be learned from ISDA and the BBA, ways to improve the 
regulation of derivatives, and the promise of governmental leveraging of 
transnational private regulation. Above all, we conclude that we cannot 
hope for better, more successful regulation — and to avert the next 
financial crisis — until we understand and appreciate the actual regulatory 
character of the past two decades.  
I. TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES
This Section begins by introducing the OTC derivatives market. It then
describes the view of the OTC market as unregulated. Next, it considers 
the possibility of transnational private (i.e. non-state) regulation of the 
OTC market. Finally, we examine the ways in which the OTC market can 
be considered to have been subject to extensive transnational private 
regulation. 
A. Introduction to Derivatives
Financial derivatives are investment instruments that derive their value
from some other financial asset.3 For example, a call option, a type of 
derivative, gives the owner of the option the privilege, but not the 
obligation, to purchase a specified asset at a specified price at some future 
date. That privilege may someday be of great value if the underlying asset 
appreciates, in which case the right to purchase it at a low price represents 
a guaranteed profit. On the other hand, if the underlying asset depreciates, 
the call option is unlikely to be used to any gain. Since the call option is an 
alienable asset, its sale price will reflect in some way the movement in price 
of the underlying asset.  
3. ALAN N. RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW 159 (2009) (“A
derivatives transaction is ‘a bilateral contract . . . whose value derives . . . from the value of an 
underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index.’”).  
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Financial derivatives serve at least three purposes for their users. First, 
they can be used to hedge, or offset, risk.4 Farmers have long used futures, 
obligations to deliver a given asset at some upcoming date, to lock in their 
profits now and avoid the volatility of the market for their crop. Swaps, 
which are promises on the part of two parties to exchange a stream of 
payments, are now used by the majority of large firms to reduce their 
interest-rate risk. Companies agree to pay a fixed rate to their bank in 
exchange for a payment stream that varies with the interest rate, thus 
assuring themselves an income stream that will vary inversely to their 
borrowing costs.  
Second, derivatives are also used for speculation. Call options can be a 
more cost-effective way to bet on the appreciation of a security than the 
direct purchase of the security. Call options entitle their owner to similar 
gains akin to owning the underlying security, but with a lower initial cost.5 
Similar derivatives allow investors to cheaply bet that a security will decline 
in value, or simply change in some direction.6  
Finally, derivatives can be used for a variety of arbitrage activities. 
Arbitrage refers to investment or business activity that notes the economic 
similarity between two seemingly different assets. The notorious hedge 
fund Long-Term Capital Management used financial derivatives to bet that 
the prices of similar assets would eventually converge.7 Arbitrage can also 
be regulatory: where a transaction has substantial regulatory costs, 
derivatives may sometimes be used to reconstruct the transaction in terms 
not covered by the regulation, preserving the economics of the transaction 
but avoiding the regulation.8 For example, a corporation may incur tax 
liability if it sells a given security. Instead of selling the security, the 
corporation may initiate a total return swap in which it promises to pay 
another party an amount reflecting any change in value in the asset, in 
exchange for a fee. Now the corporation has achieved the equivalent of a 
sale but has not actually “sold” anything for regulatory purposes.  
4. See generally id. at 159–73.
5. Access to similar returns comes paired with a greater risk of no return at all. If the option 
expires while the security’s price is below the option’s strike price, the investor receives no payment 
at all. 
6. A “straddle” is a combination of a call and a put option that rewards its owner if the security’s 
price changes in either direction. 
7. See ROGER K. LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000). 
8. See MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES 6 (1997) (explaining and 
praising regulatory arbitrage); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1661–67 (2008) (arguing that although bank 
loans and standby letters of credit expose banks to similar credit risks, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) treated standby letters of credit to the more favorable regulatory treatment of 
regular letters of credit. In this way, the OCC created a profitable regulatory arbitrage for banks to 
issue standby letters of credit rather than make loans). 
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Derivatives come in two well-recognized forms: exchange-traded and 
over-the-counter. The former are standardized contracts traded on 
regulated exchanges, such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange. The 
latter are bilateral, designed for customizability, and comprise the vast 
proportion of the derivatives market.9  
Given the OTC market’s focus on customization, it is perhaps 
surprising how closely different OTC swaps resemble one another. This 
notable fact is largely a result of the standardization of customizable terms 
provided by ISDA’s Master Agreement form contracts and accompanying 
documentation. Hundreds of trillions of dollars of OTC derivatives are 
governed by documents written by a single organization, the ISDA, and 
derive their payments from a single rate governed by another, the BBA. 
These two organizations are critical in generating the infrastructure that 
has ordered transactions in the OTC derivatives markets for much of the 
last two decades — an infrastructure that provides the multiple economic 
benefits of liquidity, certainty, and reduced transaction costs.10 
ISDA is “the largest global financial trade association,”11 with over 800 
members from fifty-five countries.12 ISDA’s trade documentation is the 
market norm for OTC derivatives,13 and the organization exercises 
tremendous influence over the form that transactions take.14 As just one 
9. See, e.g., Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2010) (citations omitted) (“OTC derivative markets are many 
times the size of exchange-traded markets and compromise [sic] roughly eighty-three percent of the 
derivative market.”). 
10. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 172–73.
11. David Mengle, Concentration of OTC Derivatives Among Major Dealers, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES,
no. 4, 2010, at 7, available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ConcentrationRN_4-10.pdf. 
12. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA: SAFE, EFFICIENT, MARKETS (2011), 
http://www.isda.org/uploadfiles/_docs/ISDA_Brochure_2011.pdf. 
13. See, e.g., BNP PARIBAS, OTC DERIVATIVES: THE CHALLENGE OF DERIVING CLEAR 
BENEFITS 18, available at 
http://securities.bnpparibas.com/jahia/webdav/site/portal/shared/documents/Market%20Insight/
White-paper-OTC-Derivatives.pdf (“the bilateral agreement adopted between two counterparties 
dealing OTC derivatives is typically the master agreement published by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA).”); INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, MARKET REVIEW OF OTC 
DERIVATIVE BILATERAL COLLATERALIZATION PRACTICES 9 (2010) (“OTC derivative transactions 
are commonly documented pursuant to either a 1992 Multi-Currency Cross Border ISDA Master 
Agreement (the 1992 Agreement) or a 2002 ISDA Master Agreement”). 
14. See, e.g., Adam J. Krippel, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives Market: The Costs, Risks and 
Politics, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 269, 280 (2011) (“The International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, Inc. (‘ISDA’) provides a standard form agreement called the ‘ISDA Master 
Agreement’ that most market participants use for their OTC derivatives transactions.”);; Adam Glass, 
Helpful Hints for the New Derivatives Regulators, FINREG21.COM (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/helpful-hints-new-derivatives-regulators (explaining that 
ISDA “is the forum in which the swap dealers and other market participants create and administer 
the terms and conditions of every major class of OTC derivative. It publishes and updates standard 
contract terms, takes positions or seeks outside counsel on interpretive questions under those 
standardized terms, and, in the case of credit derivatives, is single-handedly responsible for rewriting 
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indicator of the extent of ISDA’s penetration, eighty-five percent of the 
approximately 138,000 collateral agreements in use in the OTC derivative 
market at the end of 2011 were ISDA agreements.15 “The [ISDA] Master 
Agreement serves as an industry-standard contract available for off-the-
shelf use by counterparties.”16 
The importance of  the BBA over the last two decades is similarly 
indisputable.17 The BBA’s importance to the derivatives market began in 
1986 when it first published a daily interest-rate benchmark called the BBA 
London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR).18 Assembled from banks’ self-
evaluated borrowing costs, LIBOR is meant to provide insight into the 
cost of  funds in the most liquid market in the world. Because of  the 
importance of  the banks that operate in the London market, LIBOR is 
thought to correlate with interest rates all around the world. That 
benchmark rate is now the price term in essentially all USD-, Yen-, and 
Sterling-denominated OTC derivatives.19 
Although they are small private entities, ISDA and the BBA produce 
standards of  tremendous public influence and importance:20 the standard 
form documentation that is the norm for the OTC derivatives market, and 
the rate by which hundreds of  trillions of  dollars in interest-rate 
derivatives are traded. 
the standard terms of credit derivatives, and changing the market practices under which they are 
traded and settled”), reprinted in http://creditriskchronicles.blogspot.com/2009/08/helpful-hints-for-
new-derivatives.html. 
15. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2012 3 (2012), available at
https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/. 
16. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 173.
17. Interestingly, there is some overlap between ISDA and the BBA. ISDA grew out of efforts in 
the early 1980s to standardize OTC derivatives. Among early efforts, the British Bankers’ Association 
formed an Interest Rate Swap Working Party and Forward Rate Agreement Working Party that 
developed a set of standardized terms for interest rate swaps and forwards. GuyLaine Charles, The 
ISDA Master Agreement — Part I: Architecture, Risks and Compliance, PRAC. COMPLIANCE & RISK 
MGMT. FOR SEC. INDUS., Jan. 2012, at 25, 25–26, available at 
http://www.teiglandhunt.com/webcp/assets/rtarticles/pdf/77.pdf. The BBA formed in 1920 
through the merger of two other banking organizations but remained insignificant until the 1970s. 
Until that time, it addressed issues only on an ad hoc basis and shared staff with another industry 
group. Jane A. Sargent, Pressure Group Development in the EC: The Role of the British Bankers’ Association, 
20 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 269, 271 (1982). 
18. Historical Perspective, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/historical-perspective 
(last visited June 9, 2013). LIBOR is, of course, best known to most people as the site of probable 
manipulation. See infra notes 39–44.  
19. See, e.g., Michael Fleming et al., An Analysis of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives Transactions: Implica-
tions for Public Reporting, 557 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORTS 1, 12 (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr557.pdf. 
20. Anna Gelpern, Commentary, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 57, 63–64 (2009) (cit-
ing ISDA Staff Information, ISDA, http://isda.org/wwa/staff.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009)) (“During 
the summer of 2008, ISDA had a staff of about seventy, most of them in New York and London.”). 
BBA LIBOR has always had a staff in the low single-digits. 
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B. The Dominant Narrative
Despite a growing chorus claiming that the OTC derivatives market has
been subject to private regulation,21 much discussion of  this market has 
generally assumed that it was essentially unregulated, or subject to rapid 
wholesale deregulation — and regulatory inactivity where regulation was 
possible22 — on both sides of  the Atlantic.23 This version of  history has 
familiar milestones. In 1989, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commision (CFTC) provided a “safe harbor” from regulation for most 
OTC swaps.24 In 1992, Congress followed suit and gave the CFTC general 
exemptive power over swaps.25 At that time, the size of  the OTC market 
was about $12 trillion, notional, excluding the foreign exchange market.26 
In 1993, Metallgeschaft AG, Germany’s fourteenth-largest corporation, 
lost $1.3 billion in derivatives transactions.27 That same year, a G30 report 
on the OTC market advised no new state regulation, but instead provided 
extensive commentary on best practices that the private sector itself  could 
implement.28 That report was directed by officers at JP Morgan, ISDA, 
and others.29 
The cornerstone of  the deregulatory narrative was laid in the late 1990s. 
In a momentary reversal of  the trend up until this point, the CFTC issued 
a Concept Release announcing its intentions to increase scrutiny of  OTC 
derivatives in 1998.30 The reaction was swift. Congress responded with the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), enacted in 2000,31 which 
is typically characterized as a “sweeping deregulation of  OTC derivative 
21. See infra Part I.D.
22. Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation, and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives, 13 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 1, 33 (2010) (“Not surprisingly, the enactment of the [Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act] ushered in a period of relative inactivity in the U.S. with respect to the regulation of OTC 
derivatives markets. This regulatory stasis stood in stark contrast, however, with the precipitous 
growth and proliferation of OTC derivatives markets.”). 
23. Id. at 46–47 (The U.K.’s Financial Services Authority is also non-interventionist).
24. Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,694–95 (July 21,
1989). 
25. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992).
26. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 34 (1994). 
27. ROBERT M. CONROY, MG REFINING & MARKETING, INC. (A) 1 (Univ. of Va., Darden
Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin. ed., 1998 rev. 2000), available at http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/ 
conroyb/IESE/2002/f-1227.pdf; ANAND SHETTY & JOHN MANLEY, METALLGESELLSCHAFT’S 
HEDGING DEBACLE 2, available at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/ibec/papers/39.pdf (last visited June 8, 
2013). 
28. WORKING GRP. ON GLOBAL DERIVATIVES, DERIVATIVES PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 
(1993) [hereinafter G30 PAPER]. 
29. Id. at *7.
30. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES (1998), 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm. 
31. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 1(a)(5), app. E § 1(a),
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-366 (2000). 
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activity.”32 Among other things, the CFMA specified that OTC swaps 
between sophisticated parties could be transacted off  of  regulated 
exchanges and exempt from most of  the Commodity Exchange Act. 
Turf  wars between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
CFTC may have also contributed to a lack of  aggressive governmental 
regulation.33 From its founding, the CFTC and the SEC were at odds 
about the proper shape and distribution of  regulation in their respective 
areas, as well as the borders of  those jurisdictions. In 1982, the Shad–
Johnson Accord, named for the agency heads who helped cobble together 
an uneasy truce, gave regulatory authority over options on individual 
securities to the SEC and the rest to the CFTC.34 This trend of  
governmental inaction has also been explained by large lobbying 
expenditures by the finance industry,35 which succeeded in spreading a 
pro-financial innovation ideology and beating back regulation wherever it 
could. 
This apparent absence of  regulation of  financial instruments generally,36 
and of  derivatives in particular, has been cited as a major catalyst of  the 
global financial crisis.37 Without regulation, derivatives users were free to 
take imprudent risks, sometimes with the encouragement of  brokers and 
advisors who may not have held their clients’ interests very highly.38 With 
the proliferation of  an infinite variety of  bespoke derivatives, it became 
increasingly difficult to assess one’s indirect exposure to the failure of  a 
counterparty’s counterparty. The results of  these trends were daisy chains 
of  risk and a reduction of  available credit. As Professor Stout has put it, 
“[i]t was the deregulation of  financial derivatives that brought the banking 
system to its knees.”39 
32. Baker, supra note 9, at 1299.
33. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives
Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 356–66 (2003); 
RECHTSHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 195 (describing jurisdictional disputes between the CFTC and SEC). 
34. RECHTSHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 195.
35. Baker, supra note 9, at 1311.
36. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Listen to the IMF, America, SLATE (May 5, 2011, 1:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2011/05/listen_to_the_imf_america.sin
gle.html (“Financial deregulation in the United States was a prime cause of the global crisis that 
erupted in 2008 . . . .”). 
37. See Krippel, supra note 14, at 278; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 52–66
(describing various deregulatory changes and arguing they causally contributed to the financial crisis). 
38. For example, consider the now-infamous Abacus transaction. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to 
Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
123.htm.
39. Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can
Prevent Another, LOMBARD STREET, July 6, 2009, at 4, http://www.finreg21.com/files/finreg21-
finreg21/Lombard%207.pdf.  
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A similar story of  deregulation (and disaster) is also frequently told 
about the most important interest-rate benchmark in the world — LIBOR. 
It is by now well known that at least one of  the major banks contributing 
to the setting of  LIBOR also manipulated it.40 This manipulation was 
possible in part because of  the way that LIBOR was compiled: each day, 
the BBA would ask six or more large banks “at what rate could you 
borrow funds . . . in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”41 The 
BBA discarded the top and bottom quartile of  answers and averaged the 
remaining answers. This trimmed mean methodology was meant to 
eliminate problematic outliers from this benchmark of  bank borrowing 
costs, but no data was required to substantiate banks’ answers to this broad 
question, and there was clearly opportunity for an answering bank to tailor 
its response in order to influence the average. The deregulatory narrative 
suggests that the manipulation of  LIBOR was due to the fact that it was 
unregulated,42 and that mischief  has thrived in the vacuum of  regulation 
since the early days of  LIBOR.43 It does seem that there was no clear civil 
and criminal liability applicable to benchmark manipulation in the United 
Kingdom,44 or in most other jurisdictions.45  
Private or poor regulation, however, is not deregulation, and only by 
appreciating the OTC derivatives space in its full complexity can an 
optimal regulatory strategy be designed. In the next Section, we lay out the 
40. Others have admitted that their employees attempted to manipulate LIBOR. See generally,
Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 
YALE J. ON REG. 101 (2012). 
41. The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/the-basics (last visited June 11,
2013). 
42. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera, What’s Next to Watch in Libor Drama, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July
9, 2012, 7:46 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303567704577516450784443534.html (calling 
LIBOR a “once-unregulated process”);; Damian Reece, Record Fines for Barclays Are Just the Beginning of 
the Libor Scandal, TELEGRAPH (June 27, 2012, 8:58 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/damianreece/9360672/Record-fines-for-Barclays-
are-just-the-beginning-of-the-Libor-scandal.html (“[I]t’s surprising that setting the rate for [LIBOR] 
is unregulated.”);; Hibah Yousuf, Pressing the Reset Button on Libor, CNN MONEY (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:01 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/investing/libor-wheatley/index.html (quoting Martin 
Wheatley as stating that, "[i]n hindsight, it now appears untenable for such an important process to 
be unregulated."). 
43. See, e.g., Sean Vanatta, Libor’s Risks Emerged from Clubby London Banking Culture, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 14, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/libor-s-risks-emerged-
from-clubby-london-banking-culture.html (arguing that manipulation of “Libor,” as a general term 
for interbank lending rates, predates the BBA LIBOR now used); see also Mary Campbell, Euromarkets 
in Low Gear, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1974, at 26 (“Bank A agrees to quote a slightly above realistic 
LIBOR for the purposes of fixing the rate payable by a customer of bank B — on the understanding 
that bank B will do the same for bank A when the time comes.”). 
44. HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT ¶ 2.30 (2012), available
at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [hereinafter THE 
WHEATLEY REVIEW]. 
45. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, Discussion Paper on Benchmarks (on file with author).
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scholarly literature that has emerged concerning the reality of  regulation by 
non-state and private actors. 
C. Governance Outside the State
In October 2012, the U.K. government adopted a proposal that panel
bank submissions for the LIBOR rate should be unavailable to the public 
for three months.46 The motivation behind the proposal was that initial 
submission anonymity would permit contributor banks to more frankly 
represent their cost of borrowing, and the U.K. government’s move 
represented a paradigmatic attempt at incremental financial regulation. 
More than four years earlier, the BBA had considered the same proposal 
for the same reason. The BBA controlled the LIBOR-setting mechanism 
and easily could have imposed the same scheme.47 If it had, it would have 
in most respects been functionally identical in its operation, and it would 
have similarly represented financial regulation, albeit by a private non-
profit rather than by a government.  
The functional consequences of a supervisory directive can be identical 
irrespective of whether the state or a private actor imposes it. Indeed, the 
reality that rule-making for private entities by a non-governmental 
institution can be regulation is widely acknowledged and allows for a far 
richer and subtler analysis of the regulation applicable to any particular 
arena of our financial markets. As Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite put it 
over twenty years ago, “the intellectual stalemate between those who favor 
strong state regulation of business and those who advocate deregulation” 
is pejoratively academic, because financial participants themselves realized 
that “regulation occurs in ‘many rooms’” and that “good regulatory policy 
[involved] acceptance of the inevitability of some sort of symbiosis 
between state regulation and self-regulation.”48 Different forms of this 
broadened perspective on regulation have taken on various names across 
time, from Reisman’s celebration of the New Haven School49 to more 
recent New Governance scholarship.50 
46. Press Release, HM Treasury, Gov’t Accepts Recommendations from the Wheatley Review of 
LIBOR in Full (Oct. 17, 2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-
accepts-recommendations-from-the-wheatley-review-of-libor-in-full; see also THE WHEATLEY RE-
VIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 5.15. (“Real-time publication of submissions can create incentives to submit a 
lower rate than would otherwise have been submitted.”). We will explore this proposal in greater 
detail along with other relevant portions of the Wheatley Review. 
47. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION FEEDBACK STATEMENT (2008)
[hereinafter BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION], available at 
http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/bba-libor-review-consultation-feedback-statement/latest-
news. 
48. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992). 
49. W. Michael Reisman, International Law-making: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 101, 107 (1981) (New Haven School “liberates the inquirer from the limiting 
and . . .
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Applications of  this approach to private financial regulation have 
already born fruit. Janet Koven Levit has explored an international trade 
finance regime under the banner of  what she calls “[b]ottom-up 
lawmaking . . . [which does] not feature state policymakers but rather the 
very practitioners — both public and private — who must roll up their 
sleeves and grapple with the day-to-day technicalities of  their trade.”51 A 
process can become functionally regulated even where no sovereign au-
thoritatively imposes the norms and practices.  
D. Transnational Private Regulation of  the OTC Derivatives Market
ISDA is well-recognized as a transnational private regulator. Indeed,
noting this feature has been one of  the first and principal insights of  
almost every scholar to survey the terrain of  OTC derivatives.52 Some have 
observed the private governance character of  the OTC derivatives market 
and have attempted to place it in a broader theoretical perspective. 
Professor Baker has noted that “the Credit Derivative Determination 
Committees of  [ISDA] exemplify the highly successful and rapid growth 
distorting model of positivism, which holds that law is made by the legislature,” but includes “any 
communication between elites and politically relevant groups which shapes wide expectations about 
appropriate future behavior.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2622 n.110 (1997). 
50. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 417 (2011) (“The New Governance scholarship posits, generally, 
that the traditional top-down model of regulation, in which the power to create rules belongs 
exclusively to the state, is being replaced by a more flexible ‘governance’ model, in which power to 
set and enforce the rules is increasingly diffused among a variety of societal actors working alongside 
the governments.”); Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: 
The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 786 
(2010). 
51. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade 
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 126 (2005); see also Peer Zumbansen, The Ins and Outs of 
Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Legitimacy, Accountability, Effectiveness and a New Concept of 
“Context,” 13 GERMAN L.J. 1269, 1278–79 (2012) (“Faced with a multitude of overlapping, fast-
evolving private regulatory governance regimes in areas ranging from financial to environmental 
regulation, investment law or commercial transfers, lawyers must continue to both expand their 
expertise with regard to specialized, technical transactional areas and appreciate the relevance of non-
legal ordering and regulatory concepts which underlie and inform many of the emerging governance 
regimes.”). 
52. See, e.g., Georgette Chapman Phillips, The Jumbled Alphabet Soup of the Collapsed Home Mortgage 
Market: ABCP, CDO, CDS and RMBS, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 143, 179 (2010) (“[A]s a self-
regulating industry under the purview of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the 
derivatives market is a miserable failure.”);; Colin Scott, Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in 
Transnational Regulation, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1326, 1329 (2012) (discussing ISDA’s standard-creating 
process as transnational private regulation); Aaron Unterman, Perverse Incentives: Risk Taking and 
Reform, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., June 2009, at 11, 19–20 (“The derivatives market 
has grown to astonishing heights as a self-regulating industry under the purview of the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).”). 
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of  global private governance of  the OTC derivative markets.”53 Professor 
Biggins has echoed ISDA’s accomplishments in discussing its successful 
standardization of  OTC derivatives contracts, which has “result[ed] in the 
creation and sustenance of  a highly successful transnational private 
regulatory regime.”54 Similarly, Professor Omarova, while arguing for a 
new, more comprehensive understanding of  financial self-regulation in the 
wake of  the financial crisis, used ISDA’s creation of  standardized contracts 
for OTC derivatives transactions as a “leading example of  . . . efficiency-
enhancing private industry self-regulation in today’s financial markets.”55 
Professor Howell said that the swap market “has functioned surprisingly 
well and constitutes what must be regarded as a premier example of  
private regulation in financial markets.”56 Others have discussed private 
regulation as the sole regulatory force in parts of  the derivatives markets, 
essentially replacing international regulatory agencies with the actual mar-
ket participants.57 
ISDA and the BBA’s roles as transnational private regulators can be seen 
in its inputs (market constituents forming bureaucracies to design 
governing rules, mirroring and working alongside state regulation), outputs 
(regulatory directives and standardized documentation), results (a 
harmonized and partially regulated market), and the way in which state 
actors have deferred to them. ISDA has successfully imposed upon the 
market a remarkable degree of  regulation and harmonization of  practices. 
From the beginning, ISDA worked with the G30 to draw up detailed best 
practices guidelines for the swap business.58 ISDA has also helped to 
constrain insider trading in the derivatives space.59 
ISDA’s most important contribution has been the creation of  its 
standard form documents.60 The earliest iteration came in the 1985 Swaps 
53. Baker, supra note 9, at 1296.
54. John Biggins, ‘Targeted Touchdown' and ‘Partial Liftoff': Post-Crisis Dispute Resolution in the OTC
Derivatives Markets and the Challenge for ISDA, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1297, 1297 (2012). 
55. Omarova, supra note 500, at 444.
56. Jackson E. Howell, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 649, 665–66 (2001). 
57. See, e.g., Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A New
World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 188–89 (2009) (“[T]here is no 
international regulatory agency that directly monitors or regulates the CDS market . . . . [T]he true 
regulators of the CDS market are the participants themselves.”);; id. at 192 (discussing “ISDA’s self-
regulatory system”);; see also Paul Lejot, Cover Up! Hong Kong’s Regulation of Exchange-Traded Warrants¸ 36 
H.K. L.J. 277, 279 (2006) (discussing ISDA as the OTC derivatives market’s self-regulatory 
organization and its documentation-creating role). 
58. See, e.g., G30 PAPER, supra note 28; GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
J.P. MORGAN AND HOW WALL ST. GREED CORRUPTED ITS BOLD DREAM AND CREATED A 
FINANCIAL CATASTROPHE 35 (2010). 
59. See, e.g., Serena Ng, Trading Groups Are Agitating over Apparent Leaks on Street, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
14, 2006, at C3. 
60. See, e.g., Barry Le Vine, Comment: The Derivative Market’s Black Sheep, Regulation of Non-Cleared
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Code, abbreviated from the Code of  Standard Wording, Assumption and 
Provisions for Swaps.61 Newer versions of  the documentation contain 
three components: the Master Agreement, where harmony lies and all the 
standard terms reside; the Schedule, which modifies the Master Agreement 
where choices are to be made; and the Confirmation, which covers the 
details of  the instant transaction. Other documents are also commonly 
appended, such as collateral documents, bridging documents, which 
provide for netting across all ISDA documented transactions between the 
parties, and other definitions. Though other bodies have offered standard 
documents,62 the ISDA Master Agreement is used in more than ninety 
percent of  OTC derivative transactions.63 These standard documents have 
been called a “modern international law merchant.”64 Without these 
standard documents, “parties would be plagued by arduous negotiation.”65 
ISDA’s process of  updating and implementing these documents has 
numerous regulatory characteristics. ISDA employs about 3000 people in 
its documentation committee,66 which reacts quickly to modify docu-
ments — striking and redefining terms — to remain efficient as legal and 
economic circumstances change.67 This process also preserves 
international harmony of  treatment. For example, the 1992 version of  the 
ISDA Master Agreement provided a thirty-day cure period during which a 
debtor might contest involuntary bankruptcy and thereby avoid the 
characterization of  “default.”68 The 2002 version shortens this period to 
fifteen days.69 Some practitioners have criticized this durational shift, 
emphasizing that it can take more than fifteen days to even issue a 
summons in an involuntary bankruptcy, if  only because of  a “dilatory 
clerk.”70 Yet this shorter rule provides international certainty that is largely 
immune from domestic variation in bureaucratic delay.  
Security-Based Swaps Under Dodd–Frank, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 699, 710–11 (2011) (noting 
“significant operational standardization that has taken place over the past five years, such as 
harmonization of default criteria in master ISDA agreements.”). 
61. See, e.g., Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 677, 737 (2002). 
62. Id. at 740.
63. See, e.g., Henry Knox, Master Artfulness, THE LAWYER (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.thelawyer.com/master-artfulness/1007152.article. 
64. Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L. L. 255, 275 n.56 (1998). 
65. 6 THOMAS J. MOLONEY ET AL., BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS § 70:17 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2012); see also Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade 
Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 211 (2001).
66. Gelpern, supra note 20, at 65–66.
67. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1144 (2006).
68. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, § 5(a)(vii)(4) (1992).
69. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, § 5(a)(vii)(4) (2002).
70. Mark D. Sherrill, Involuntary Bankruptcy and the ISDA Master Agreement: A Square Peg and a Round
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Though scholars have often described the ways in which legislatures will 
respond to clear judicial determinations to confirm or override judicial 
decisions, we observe little of  this dialogue in practice.71 By contrast, 
transnational private regulators lead the state sector in harmonizing quasi-
legislation with an iterative interpretation process. For example, the 2002 
version of  the ISDA Master Agreement provides in Part (2)(a)(iii) that a 
non-defaulting party can withhold payments to a defaulting party during 
the period of  default, creating a valuable option that permits the non-
defaulting party to maintain its claim. The question in the Lomas case was 
how long can the non-defaulting party wait.72 Forever? Until the next 
payment date?73 Or until the natural end of  the transaction?74 ISDA 
supported giving the non-defaulting party essentially unlimited time to 
revive its claim,75 while some prior decisions had suggested shorter “use it 
or lose it” rules. Recent judicial decisions have clarified the clause 
consistently with ISDA’s suggestion. But ISDA is contemplating an 
amendment to clarify the clause in any case, and perhaps even to 
contradict its prior position now that its constituents can evaluate a clear 
rule. This illustrates that ISDA is legislative and in dialogue with the courts. 
Through the use of  protocols, ISDA is able to update contracts on an 
ongoing basis.76 Protocols are multilateral contractual amendments, drafted 
by ISDA, which then solicits letters of  adherence from swap participants. 
When all parties to a swap accept the protocol, the protocol becomes 
binding on the parties, allowing them to assent contingently to multiple 
contract amendments at once.77 This is much the same way as Delaware’s 
legislature and courts are able to update the default corporate form from 
time to time, retroactively modifying the guiding documents for Delaware 
incorporated firms.78 In other words, ISDA is a forum for the provision of  
authoritative directives with quasi-precedential force. 
ISDA also functions as a sort of  adjudicator through the use of  its 
Credit Determinations Committees.79 Key terms, such as “default” in a 
Hole, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2008, at 1, 60 (citing Windbrooke Dev. Corp. v. Envtl. Enters., Inc. 
of Fla., 524 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
71. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Process of American Law (Univ. of Ariz. James E.
Rogers Coll. of Law, Discussion Paper No. 13-12, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220505. 
72. Lomas v. JFB Firth Rixson, Inc., [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch).
73. Marine Trade S.A. v. Pioneer Freight Futures Co. BVI, [2009] EWHC 2656 (Comm).
74. Lomas, [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, § III(B) (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 545, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125169. 
77. About ISDA Protocols, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-
management/about-isda-protocols/ (last visited June 2, 2013). 
78. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2006).
79. See Verstein, supra note 76; see also Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies (Am. Univ.
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credit default swap (CDS), cannot be described in granular detail ex ante, so 
ISDA contracts specify that a Credit Determinations Committee will have 
the power to define any such term. Thus, when parties want contractual 
clarity, any party can make a request to the appropriate committee to 
define the contractual term. In some cases, this amounts to a 
determination as to whether the CDS is or is not in default at the present 
time. These determinations can be fast, giving parties clarity as to their 
entitlements in near real-time. They can then move to seize collateral, 
renegotiate, or litigate as need be. Because these determinations are 
binding on the contract but not enforceable as judgments, and are based 
on general facts about the contract and the market rather than specific 
investigations of  a party-specific dispute, they are akin to administrative 
proceedings rather than outright adjudication. In the absence of  speedy, 
trustworthy courts for arbitration, the market’s need for timely 
determination is met by a non-state actor. Just as norms can be 
promulgated by a transnational private regulator, rather than a legislature, 
they can be adjudged by a transnational private regulator rather than a 
court.  
In addition to playing legislative and judicial roles, ISDA materials are 
frequently incorporated in state law and regulation. Sometimes, legislative 
materials refer to ISDA and its documentation by name, such as when the 
New York Insurance Law specifically mentions ISDA documentation in 
the definition of  a credit default swap.80 Usually, incorporation is not by 
name.81 Yet, nameless reference can be equally powerful, such as when the 
Bankruptcy Code defines a swap by way of  a Master Agreement.82 
Incorporation of  this ISDA innovation, though without ISDA’s name on 
it, is part of  how domestic law implements international norms of  netting. 
And, of  course, ISDA’s pervasive role in structuring the shape of  the OTC 
space — the space that is largely exempt from the Commodity Exchange 
Act — is not mentioned in any such statute or rule.83 
State reliance on, and reference to, the ISDA regime is consistent with 
Cunningham’s analysis of  the public implementation of  private standards 
into law. 84 Cunningham discusses different forms of  interaction between 
formal state law and private governance norms. He identifies three levels 
of  state recognition of  private norms: (1) when the law merely mentions 
Wash. Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 2012-37, 2012). 
80. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j)(1) (McKinney 2005); see also id. at (g)(5)(A)(ii) (defining collateral in
terms of ISDA documentation). 
81. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 186 (2007).
82. 11 U.S.C.A. § 53B(v) (West 2013).
83. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 81, at 186.
84. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of
Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005) (creating a typology for different types of private standards 
used in law). 
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private norms, (2) when the law incorporates private norms into law after 
their creation, and (3) when the law formally recognizes a private body as a 
state-endorsed standards creator.85 ISDA and the BBA, as will be discussed 
below, operate principally at the first two of  these levels. Partnoy similarly 
analyzes the OTC space: “[O]ne might argue that Congress implemented a 
de facto strong standards regime, relying on ISDA, based on ISDA’s 
dominance at the time.”86 Partnoy surveys evidence of  the strength of  
ISDA’s standards and their direct incorporation into law, as well as the law’s 
sometimes-silent reliance on those standards.87 As an example of  the 
former, there are a large number of  legal decisions relying on ISDA; as an 
example of  the latter, globally there are a vast number of  statutes and 
regulations that reflect provisions of  ISDA form contracts, but do not 
mention ISDA by name.88 
No doubt, some of  this incorporation reflects the influence ISDA has 
had in shaping state regulation.89 But even ISDA’s influence on state 
regulation does not imply a passive, deregulatory state. States can 
sometimes stoop to conquer. If  ISDA is known to have a harmonizing, 
rationalizing agenda, states know that rendering themselves open to ISDA’s 
influence will tend to advance harmonized, rational governance. The 
passive stance toward ISDA can be an active stance toward the OTC 
derivatives market.  
By comparison, the BBA’s operation as a private regulator with 
international power has gone remarkably unnoticed,90 especially when the 
prominence of  LIBOR in the last year is taken into account. Nonetheless, 
its regulatory role is undeniable. Like ISDA, the BBA’s most important 
contribution to the OTC derivatives market is as a harmonizing force 
within its sector. ISDA created a viable and harmonized set of  terms for 
agreements,91 but in the early days of  interest-rate swaps, “nonuniformity 
was a significant problem” in price as well.92 Difficulty agreeing upon a 
85. Id. at 293.
86. Partnoy, supra note 81, at 187.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. G30 REPORT, supra note 28. 
90. It is easy to focus on anti-regulatory activity. The BBA’s founding activity was resisting
harmonization at the pan-European level, and, in general, state and inter-state regulation and 
harmonization wherever possible. Notebook International: Brussels: Initiative Required, 123 THE BANKER 
1421, at 1421 (Dec. 1973) (“harmonization should be limited to as few issues as possible and be 
based on the principles of maximum flexibility and self-regulation.”). Yet even as the BBA resisted 
governmental harmonization efforts, it worked to rationalize the norms of a disorderly banking 
landscape.  
91. Interestingly, the BBA drafted the first model swap agreement, which was quickly superseded
by ISDA documentation. See, e.g., Vanatta, supra note 43. 
92. Id.
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rate within a given document could be a major sticking point in a 
negotiation. As Jeffrey Golden put it: 
Market participants fought about everything, even the fallback rate. 
That is to say there were pitched battles about what the rate would 
be and how it would be determined if  it was impossible to find a 
reference bank in London that would quote an offered rate for 
deposits in the interbank market. Do you go to another market, 
and, if  so, which one? Do you seek quotations from one, three or 
five reference banks in that market?93 
There are also large network benefits associated with using a single price 
in many transactions. Some of these benefits are the same as with non-
price terms: Common terms make it easier to find a third party willing to 
assume one’s responsibilities and more likely that a court will honor those 
responsibilities; common terms create liquidity through ease of use and 
standardization; and common terms eliminate transaction costs. But price 
commands an additional reason for widespread use, because when a price 
term is well-known financial actors can generate extensive knowledge 
about the rate and its relation to their other options and positions. LIBOR 
is sufficiently well-known that financial models predict its motion in 
relation to other benchmarks, and parties are likely to have multiple 
LIBOR exposures to which they can relate the newly contemplated swap. 
They can minimize basis risk with little difficulty, rather than trying to 
estimate how a non-LIBOR rate might link with their other exposures.  
Like ISDA, the BBA’s role as a transnational regulator has been both 
reflected and endorsed through governmental decisions. Indeed, LIBOR’s 
ubiquity arose in part through the choices of  state agents. Courts have 
long adverted to LIBOR in their assessment of  damages.94 Many laws 
require or prefer the use of  a well-known index, and parties who select 
LIBOR are essentially granted a safe harbor due to judicial and 
administrative preferences.95 For example, the Parity Act allows non-
federally chartered housing creditors to lend with adjustable rates, 
provided that they use “a national or regional index,”96 which the Office 
93. Jeffrey B. Golden, Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation, 13 INT’L FIN. L. REV.
18 (1994). Golden actually refers to “Libor” in the foregoing, but means by it only a generic term for 
an interest rate benchmark, not the BBA LIBOR that would come to be synonymous with LIBOR.  
94. See, e.g., Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 566 F. Supp. 1558,
1579 (D. Del. 1983) (“In such cases, the rate employed has been the average borrowing rate an 
average plaintiff would have had to pay to receive the same amount of money . . . . It follows that the 
LIBOR rate, which represents the cost of borrowing US$ (the currency at issue here) should be 
utilized in this case.”). 
95. Stein v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 279 F. Supp. 2d 286, 290 (taking judicial notice of interest
rates of indexes published in the Wall Street Journal). 
96. McCarthy v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 362 F.3d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Title VIII of the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
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of  the Comptroller of  the Currency and courts have consistently found 
LIBOR to be.97 
State actors also use LIBOR in their own transactions. U.S. regulators 
used LIBOR as a key rate in making loans to troubled firms during the 
financial crisis, such as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury’s bailout loans 
to AIG.98 Furthermore, LIBOR is the Department of  Commerce’s 
preferred rate when engaging in foreign currency transactions.99 This is 
consistent with the notion that powerful network effects are often 
established (or exacerbated) by public institutions.100 But it also shows the 
ways in which powerful private governance exists as an extension of, and 
in conversation with, the public regulatory state, such as the way in which 
the U.S. government deferred to credit rating agencies and incorporated 
them into law.101 
Considering its origin as a private institution, it is interesting just how 
public a character and outlook the BBA’s LIBOR regulation has assumed. 
Prior to the widespread allegations of  manipulation in 2007, 2008, and 
2011, the BBA initiated major efforts to formalize and professionalize its 
governance activities. These efforts are what John Ewan, former director 
of  LIBOR, called his most important early task at the BBA.102 He set 
about formalizing a set of  rules for rate calculation, data contribution, and 
determination of  veracity. The BBA enacted and clarified rules requiring 
certification of  contributor banks’ processes by their own auditor and risk 
management or compliance department. Without legal coercion, the BBA 
adopted a set of  regulations that aimed at improving veracity. 
These safeguards were obviously inadequate. Yet, when news broke 
indicating that these efforts may have been insufficient to prevent 
manipulation, the BBA initiated a consultative inquiry as to how the 
LIBOR rate could be rendered more useful and secure. The 2008 
consultation was released in December of  that year.103 
Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(1)). 
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Tim Geithner Admits Banks Bailed Out with Rigged Libor, Costing Taxpayers
Huge Amount, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (July 25, 2012, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/timothy-geithner-libor_b_1701904.html. 
99. Hornos Electronicos de Venezuela, S.A. v. U.S., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1369 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2003). 
100. See DAVID SINGH GREWALL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION (2009). 
101. Concerns of network power will also be especially apt where the value of harmonization to a
market is especially significant, as many have recognized it to be in the OTC derivatives market. We 
thus should not neglect the BBA and ISDA’s valuable (and dangerous) achievement in effectively 
becoming monopolists over two highly valuable public goods — the transactional structure of OTC 
derivative customization and the interest rate reference for short-term loans. 
102. Interview with John Ewan, Former Dir. of LIBOR, British Bankers’ Ass’n., in London (June
15, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with John Ewan]. 
103. See generally FX & MM COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, LIBOR GOVERNANCE AND SCRUTINY:
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The results of  that process were modest changes to the governance 
structure. Chairs were created for additional constituencies, such as non-
contributor banks in the United States and Europe, the principal options 
exchanges in the United States and London, and fund and corporate 
borrowers, to help administer the rate. As of  January 2010, BBA LIBOR 
has also been governed by an independent board.104 
These changes appear to have done little to stop subsequent attempts at 
manipulation from taking place. Procedures remained lax, chummy, 
informal, or ineffective. But this is not to say that there was no regulation. 
After all, the light touch approach — governance by stern looks, and the 
like — has long characterized English state governance as well.105  
It is also interesting that the BBA’s investigation appears to have 
considered nearly every option both suggested and implemented by 
subsequent state regulators.106 Many of  these options were rejected by the 
BBA, for reasons we may or may not accept. But they undeniably engaged 
in public rulemaking by interviewing the relevant constituencies and 
sharing the results of  that inquiry and the reasons that guided them.  
LIBOR assumed some public functions as the state sector increasingly 
withdrew from those functions. For example, until October 1979 the 
Federal Reserve took an interest in providing stable interest rates, and 
therefore concerned itself  with reducing interest rate risk. Under Paul 
Volcker’s leadership, the Federal Reserve shifted its focus to combating 
inflation in the real economy and allowing the federal funds rate to move 
as it might.107 Interest rate volatility increased enormously and the market 
had to look away from government regulators for protection and stability. 
At the same time, a confluence of  forces led to the rise of  offshore 
interbank dollar funds, or Eurodollar deposits, as a source of  financing.108 
LIBOR provided banks with just such a tool to reduce volatility. Banks 
wishing to make long-term loans could provide LIBOR loans, a variable 
PROPOSALS AGREED BY THE FX & MM COMMITTEE (2008), available at 
http://www.bbalibor.com/download/4025. 
104. Governance, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/governance. Note, however, that the
members of the board are secret. 
105. See, e.g., Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11
n.24 (discussing whether U.K. regulation is appropriately described as “light touch”).
106. See discussion infra Part II.A–C.
107. See, e.g., David E. Lindsey et al., The Reform of October 1979: How It Happened and Why, 87 (2,
part 2) FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 187 (2005), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/05/03/part2/Lindsey.pdf. 
108. See Hugh S. Piggott, The Historical Development of Syndicated Eurocurrency Loan Agreements, 10
INT’L BUS. L. 199, 199 (1982) (arguing that interest rate caps on time deposits in America and interest 
prohibitions on demand deposits made raising funds in America more difficult); Philip R. Wood, 
Essay: Sovereign Syndicated Bank Credits in the 1970s, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (2010) (noting 
that interest-equalization tax discouraged loans outside of the United States, and that oil price hikes 
led to dollar outflows into overseas accounts). 
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rate loan that moved with their funding costs. Borrowers unwilling to 
accept the interest rate risk inherent in the loan could engage in swap 
transactions to receive an offsetting payment and pay a fixed rate. The 
variable liability could be reassigned to whomever was best able to accept 
interest rate risk. Financial engineering with LIBOR-priced loans and 
swaps became a source of  interest rate stability at precisely the moment 
that the Federal Reserve withdrew from the task, allowing banks to lend at 
a rate reflecting their true cost of  funds. This transition took place with 
the tacit approval of  regulators.109 
The history of  the Commodity Futures Modernization Act’s enactment 
also suggests that a government can decide to regulate through deploying a 
transnational private regulator. Some have gone as far as to suggest that 
ISDA basically drafted the CFMA — the legislation that created almost 
two decades of  de facto exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of  the OTC 
derivatives market for ISDA. As one author put it, Senators Lugar and 
Gramm “quietly inserted this 262-page bill (written by the ISDA) into a 
$384 billion, 11,000-page omnibus budget bill.”110 Indeed, the role of  
ISDA may have been even stronger. 
ISDA lobbied successfully for enactment of  the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act in 2000, which exempted OTC derivatives 
from regulation by the federal agency that supervises futures and 
commodities exchanges. ISDA’s skill in promoting standardization in swap 
market practice, documentation, and settlement was important in this 
decision, and effectively ended pressure for direct regulation of  OTC 
derivative products, both in the United States and elsewhere.111 
Frank Partnoy draws something like the same causal connection in the 
context of  ISDA’s important role as a standards-setting organization.112 As 
he puts it, “one might argue that Congress implemented a de facto strong 
standards regime, relying on ISDA, based on ISDA's dominance at the 
time. Judicial reliance on ISDA standards would support such a strong 
109. Hillbrandt, ICI’s finance director, asserts that the Bank of England was briefed on the use of
swaps to facilitate the Eurodollar market and was “favorably inclined to the use of swap 
arrangements of this type.” Raphael Hodgson, The Birth of the Swap, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 32, 34 
(2009).  
110. Mark Labaton, Swap Meet: An Understanding of the Development of Credit Default Swaps Can Point
the Way to Real Financial Industry Regulatory Reform, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Oct. 2009, at 24, 28, 
available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol32No7/2637.pdf. 
111. Lejot, supra note 57, at 292–93 (“ISDA lobbied successfully for enactment of the US
Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000, which exempted OTC derivatives from regulation 
by the federal agency that supervises futures and commodities exchanges. ISDA’s skill in promoting 
standardisation in swap market practice, documentation and settlement was important in this 
decision, and effectively ended pressure for direct regulation of OTC derivative products, both in the 
United States and elsewhere.”). 
112. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 81, at 187.
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interpretation. More than eighty published cases have relied on ISDA in 
reaching decisions.”113 
The foregoing is not an argument that ISDA or the BBA have been 
consistently excellent regulators. Numerous complaints can be made, from 
the manipulation of  LIBOR to the backlog in derivatives confirmations.114 
Though it can be rational for states to outsource regulation, the recipients 
of  that power may be venal or inept; but they are still regulators. The next 
Part considers the implications of  characterizing the OTC market as 
having been subject to private regulation. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION OF
THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
A. Moderating Reactive Regulation
There is a well-documented process by which laws are written in great
number and length in the wake of  regulatory failure and crisis, and these 
laws may be unduly punitive, rushed, or otherwise problematic.115 This 
phenomenon seems to be especially prevalent in the financial space.116 
This is not just a pathology of  lawmaking; once the deregulated status 
quo is accepted, new regulation stems from common sense. A new sweep 
of  regulation may bring unanticipated problems, but who will decline the 
offer of  “regulation” when the discredited alternative is “no regulation”? 
Recognizing that the status quo was regulated may hold some promise 
of  tempering this cycle. The regulation was insufficient, co-opted, corrupt, 
or mistaken, so reform is required. However, the resultant reform is from 
regulation to regulation, regulator to regulator, which necessarily involves a 
more sophisticated approach. Consider, in comparison, the criticism of  
thrift regulation under the Office of  Thrift Supervision (OTS). 
113. Id.
114. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1315; see also Siona Robin Listokin, MetaRegulation of OTC Derivatives
Contracts Post Reform (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499964 (discussing indus-
try’s failure to address confirmation backlog). 
115. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(2012); STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860 257 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOU. L. REV. 77, 79 
(2003); Mark J. Roe, Washington and Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2009); 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1591–94 (2005). 
116. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial 
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 74–
89 (2009). For example, Bainbridge noted of our intellectual property proposal that “even if it had 
merit as a stand-alone reform, Rauterberg and Verstein’s proposal surely was unrealistic in terms of 
practical politics.” Stephen Bainbridge, Reforming Libor: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 45–50 (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-02) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209970. 
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Washington Mutual, AIG, Countrywide Financial and other prominent 
financial institutions held charters as thrifts, regulated by the OTS.117 
These institutions performed poorly during the financial crisis, having 
been allowed to binge on risky mortgage-backed instruments, swaps, and 
subprime assets.118 The OTS was savagely criticized and then disbanded — 
the nuclear option in administrative discipline. We did not act, however, as 
though thrifts were roaming brigands, free from all regulation. We knew 
that they were regulated, but badly, and so we set about integrating them 
into a regulatory regime that made more sense.  
If  the problematic past had zero regulation, then it makes sense to think 
that any non-zero amount of  regulation is likely to be an improvement. 
However, if  the past was regulated, then any change is a change in 
regulation rather than an initiation of  regulation. Proposals must be 
justified as superior to existing regulation rather than simply superior to no 
regulation. Substantively, this framing is likely to lead to more nuanced and 
moderate regulatory responses.  
What would this more nuanced approach to regulatory reform look 
like? LIBOR’s failure has prompted numerous reform proposals, some of  
which have been adopted, and some of  which may yet be. It is nonsense to 
act as though these proposals are against a blank slate when most of  these 
proposals were explicitly considered by the BBA. Even if  that body has 
been discredited, it bears considering the arguments that might have 
justified resisting the proposals previously. 
The Wheatley Review is a blue ribbon report prepared by Martin 
Wheatley, the CEO designate of  the United Kingdom’s soon-to-be new 
financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The FCA will 
have control over most non-stability related financial regulation.119 
Wheatley’s September 2012 report made a series of  proposals,120 which the 
U.K. government has endorsed in full and has already begun to 
implement.121 The recommendations suggest increased public oversight of  
the index (LIBOR), including substantive requirements for how the index 
must be created, and increased penalties for malfeasance.  
Fascinatingly, almost all of  the 2012 Wheatley reforms were considered 
by the BBA in its 2008 consultative paper. Many were rejected, often for 
reasons acknowledged by Wheatley in his reports. As regulators consider 
117. See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of Thrift Supervision’s
Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1779 n.5 (2011). 
118. See id. at 1777 (evaluating relative performance of thrifts).
119. See, e.g., Sam Robinson, The Financial Conduct Authority — Its Role in the New UK Regulatory
Framework, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/the-
financial-conduct-authority/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). 
120. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44.
121. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT 2 (2012), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_fst_171012.pdf. 
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moving forward, they should take stock of  the evaluation of  their 
regulatory predecessor. 
The BBA also considered changes to the index that might better serve 
the public, but declined to do so for avowedly public interest reasons. If  
taken at its word, the BBA’s inaction was a deliberate regulatory decision. 
At a minimum, the BBA showed sophistication about what others would 
take to be its responsibility. Taking stock of  the BBA report, the lesson is 
that with any reform effort, the reforms necessarily involve trade-offs that 
prior BBA regulatory consultations highlighted.122 We will provide 
numerous examples of  this later. For now, at least three trade-offs are 
notable in discussing any improvement of  LIBOR:  
(1) Reform versus stability (or, the “grandfathering problem”): Any proposal that
makes important changes to the index will upset market expectations for 
those who began using the index prior to reform. Many market 
participants may prefer the devil that they know. Others may be concerned 
about distributional effects of  even efficient improvements in LIBOR. If  
an improved LIBOR skews higher as a result, it will disadvantage the payor 
on a LIBOR instrument. Finally, substantial changes to the rate could 
result in legal challenges to the validity of  linked instruments.  
(2) Transparency versus opacity: It is easy to be upset about the lack of
transparency in LIBOR, which allows bad behavior to go unnoticed or 
unverified. However, opacity has its virtues since reputational manipulation 
of  LIBOR was a direct result of  banks’ fears that true but embarrassing 
submissions would be revealed to the public. Likewise, rules and data make 
it easier for third parties to game the system by engaging in transactions 
pitched to the rules. 
(3) Public accountability versus optimal incentives: Government ownership of
an index, stipulation of  rules, or harsh punishment for index wrongdoers 
may increase a sense of  public oversight. However, the government may 
lack incentive and the knowledge to craft an index correctly, and harsh 
rules and penalties may drive participants away from contributing to the 
index. 
An improvement to one aspect of  the indexing processes necessarily 
increases risks in another. The rest of  this subpart examines the reforms 
recommended by the Wheatley Review, the reforms implemented by 
settlements with three banks, and reforms suggested but not yet 
implemented. For each, understanding the trade-offs involved in regulatory 
change helps sensitize us to the costs of  any particular proposal.  
122. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40.
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1. Fewer LIBORs
The Wheatley Review proposes that LIBOR will be quoted in fewer
tenors and currencies. As it stands, LIBOR is quoted in ten currencies and 
at fifteen different borrowing durations. Some of  these are based on 
markets with substantial volume, such as the overnight USD rate. Some 
are extensively used by third parties, such as the three-month USD rate, 
which is among the most important for U.S. subprime mortgage pricing.123 
Yet, some are little used by third parties,124 and based on very few 
underlying transactions, such as the eleven-month Swedish Krona.125 
Recognizing the potential to manipulate such a thinly-traded market, 
Wheatley recommends eliminating 130 of  the 150 LIBOR rates.126  
The BBA considered eliminating tenors as well, but declined to do so. 
While the Wheatley review asserts that the cost of  eliminating lesser tenors 
is low, the BBA considered them significant. As John Ewan said, “Should 
we stop doing these? Somewhere, someone is doing a product that links to 
the unlikely rate.”127 Without knowing who was using the unlikely rate and 
why they deemed it better than a market favorite, the BBA was unwilling 
to act. The BBA recently published a consultative report surveying various 
market participants as to their feelings on eliminating such little-used 
tenors. This report confirmed Wheatley’s sense that many LIBORs were 
not favorites of  the market, but also confirmed Ewan’s sense that there 
remain devoted users of  these benchmarks who will be the losers in any 
elimination plan.128 For example, a majority of  respondents agreed that the 
BBA could eliminate its little used tenors, as well as the Australian Dollar, 
New Zealand Dollar, Canadian Dollar, Danish Krone, and Swedish Krona 
fixing. Nevertheless, for each of  these, between nine percent and twenty-
nine percent of  the respondents opposed discontinuing the rate. There 
appears to be a significant group of  users that finds these rates to be at 
least sometimes useful.129  
Here, as with elsewhere, the BBA appears to have taken grandfathering 
concerns seriously. Again, recent market surveys substantiate the BBA’s 
caution. More than half  of  the market participants surveyed expressed 
123. Fifty-nine percent of USD-denominated swaps and floating rate notes that cite LIBOR 
utilize the three-month tenor. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 36 tbl. 5.A. 
124. Essentially zero percent of interest rate swaps and floating rate notes quote the one-, three-, 
six-, or twelve-month Swedish Krona. Id. 
125. Less than seven of the LIBOR banks engaged in Swedish Krona borrowing in any
substantial quantity, and none did so at the eleven-month maturity. Id. at 30 tbl. 4.A. 
126. Id. ¶¶ 5.9–5.10.
127. Interview with John Ewan, supra note 102.
128. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, STRENGTHENING LIBOR — PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 6 OF THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR — SUMMARY OF 
FEEDBACK RECEIVED (2013), available at http://www.bbalibor.com/download/8739. 
129. Id. at 3–5.
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concern about rapid removal of  lightly-traded tenors, and substantial 
minorities expressed concern about removal of  such tenors and currencies 
even within the longer time horizon suggested by Wheatley.130 
Wheatley’s response acknowledged that eliminating tenors would 
decrease cross-tenor corroboration.131 Likewise, there was reported 
concern “about the impact on those contracts that reference these rates 
and the associated market disruption, suggesting a cautious approach in 
this respect and that, in each case, an appropriate consultation with the 
relevant domestic authorities should be undertaken to ensure minimal 
disruption.”132  
2. Quote Anonymity
Wheatley also proposes that LIBOR-rate contributions be unavailable
to the public for three months. The thought is that this will allow 
contributor banks to more honestly represent their cost of  borrowing, 
since they need not fear that high costs will be immediately reported to the 
market and interpreted as a sign of  weakness.133 It may also make it more 
difficult for a cartel to enforce an agreement to manipulate the rate, since a 
breach of  the agreement would remain invisible for some time.134 
Additionally, would-be manipulators could not so easily predict the effect 
of  their quote upon the overall field,135 since they could not observe how 
close the rate was to being rounded up or down.136  
Once again, looking at the BBA provides insight into the trade-offs of  
this regulation. The BBA considered such a proposal and declined after 
consultation with its constituents. Sixty-one percent of  respondents told 
the BBA that the existing level of  anonymity was best, and only fifteen 
percent wished an increase in opacity of  rates.137 Wheatley’s compromise 
between transparency and opacity, a period of  delay before data are 
released, was endorsed by exactly two of  the BBA respondents.138 Market 
130. Id.
131. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, app. ¶ B.13.
132. Id. app. ¶ B.12.
133. Id. ¶ 5.15 (“Real-time publication of submissions can create incentives to submit a lower rate
than would otherwise have been submitted.”). 
134. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 32. This hardly seems significant since cartel 
members could voluntarily show their participation through any number of means. 
135. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 5.15.
136. However, given the ease with which contributors, traders, and voice brokers communicated,
it would seem that this reform will have little effect unless other dynamics are substantially changed. 
137. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47, ¶ 1.14 (“Many
respondents, and particularly those of the contributing banks, considered that a decrease in the 
current level of transparency would not necessarily be interpreted as positive move.”). This is 
consistent with the information gathered by the Wheatley Review. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra 
note 44. 
138. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47, § 3.18.
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participants were concerned that a lack of  transparency on submissions 
could further cast a shadow over the rate, as participants could not readily 
compare submission data to comparable metrics. Many of  the important 
studies identifying LIBOR manipulation relied on bank-level data to 
determine where banks’ self-evaluation of  creditworthiness did not match 
the market.  
B. The Settlements
Not only are new regulations emerging from explicit, legislative reforms
in the United States and United Kingdom, but enforcement and action 
through the judicial system are making an equally important impact. The 
recent internationally-coordinated settlements between state regulators and 
LIBOR panel banks illustrate how settlements can function as regulation. 
Furthermore, they underscore the interaction of  domestic governmental 
regulators (operating through both enforcement and legislation) and 
transnational private regulators in regulating aspects of  the OTC 
derivatives market. 
In June 2012, Barclays PLC settled Commodity Exchange Act violations 
with the CFTC. Barclays’ settlement involved numerous non-financial 
terms. It agreed to substantive provisions for how it will contribute to 
benchmark rates. Within six months of  the Barclays order in December 
2012, UBS similarly settled claims with the CFTC and Britain’s market 
conduct regulator on essentially the same terms.139  
The settlement provides directives for how Barclays must calculate its 
LIBOR quote submissions. Barclays must give its own transactions the 
greatest weight in determining submissions,140 though it may modify that 
data with subjective assessments of  market and counterparty conditions.141 
The settlement also extensively specifies the oversight and governance 
structures within the firm.142 Firewalls, both bureaucratic and geographic, 
139. UBS AG & UBS Sec. Japan Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,481 (Dec. 19, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfub 
sorder121912.pdf (order instituting proceedings pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act making findings and imposing remedial sanctions). 
140. Barclays PLC, No. 12-25, at 32 (C.F.T.C. June 27, 2012), available at 
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbarclays 
order062712.pdf (noting that submissions may include overnight index swaps, currency futures, 
repos, futures, Fed Funds and other factors).  
141. Id. at 33 (noting that other factors may include time, market events, term structure, credit 
standards, counterparty conditions and baselines). 
142. Id. at 34 (requiring the daily submissions to be reviewed every day by a supervisor 
experienced in the market and prohibiting supervisors and submitters from having compensation 
linked to derivatives trading or being derivatives traders); id. at 39 (requiring compliance personnel to 
physically visit trading floors at least monthly).  
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are to be established.143 Extensive records are to be kept144 — even of  
factors that are notoriously intangible145 — and the data must be coded 
along eighteen axes.146 Regular disclosures to regulators are required,147 as 
are audits.148 The settlement even includes public advocacy 
requirements.149 
It is fair to say that these settlement-imposed changes to the rate-setting 
process are far more extensive than those proposed by the Wheatley 
Review. Settlements for past wrongdoing entail an avenue for substantial 
public oversight and substantive prescription of  business conduct. This is 
regulation by settlement, and it comes as a replacement to a governance 
regime that was deemed to be inadequate, but which contemplated many 
of  these prescriptions. 
The BBA declined to provide extensive ex ante guidance as to how 
banks must produce their submissions and to put “twenty minions at each 
bank to make sure they are flying straight.”150 They deemed themselves 
comparatively less well-equipped than banks to tell each bank how best to 
craft its own compliance and risk management,151 and to draft extensive 
rules that would apply in various and future cases. Instead, the BBA 
required banks to have their own compliance and auditing services certify 
their submissions. The BBA also deemed it appropriate to offer only 
minimal guidance, such as that the cash dealer and not the swap trader 
must submit the quotes. Likewise, the BBA played a role in clarifying the 
143. Id. at 34–35.
144. Id. at 37 (requiring that essentially all communication about the index be preserved, with
preservation time depending on the media format and location of the individuals); id. at 37 (requiring 
trades and positions, and those of other traders dealing with these markets, to be recorded and kept); 
id. at 36 (requiring supervisor identity be recorded and kept for five years); id. at 35 (requiring the 
preservation of all models and methods included in submissions); id. at 35 (requiring the preservation 
of all voice broker offers and information, including identification (company, person, etc.) of specific 
offers upon which submission is based). 
145. Id. at 35–36 (requiring the preservation of the definition of “reasonable market size” used in 
the submission); id. at 36 (requiring that submissions note which specify market announcements or 
effects entered into their assessment and what effects those events were deemed to have had); id. at 
35 (requiring Barclays to keep a record of each submission for five years, including the factors that 
influenced the submission and their relative weight, and a list of the transactions deemed non-
representative and therefore not included).  
146. Id. at 36 (requiring transactional data to note, inter alia, customer number, interest basis 
(360/365-day year) and maturity date). 
147. Id. at 40 (requiring Barclays to make an interim report to the CFTC about its progress every
four months); id. at 41 (requiring the immediate report of any attempted manipulation or improper 
conduct to the CFTC); id. at 35 (requiring that all of these records be available to the CFTC at any 
time, without subpoena). 
148. Id. at 38 (requiring an internal audit every six months, including random sample of 
submissions and evidence); id. at 35 (requiring a third-party audit annually). 
149. Id. at 42 (requiring Barclays to advocate for the index provider to signal whether rates are
based on actual transactions). 
150. Interview with John Ewan, supra note 102.
151. Id.
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rules whenever changing circumstances made clarification useful, such as 
whether a government-supported loan’s cost should count when a bank 
calculated its cost of  funds. Ongoing, particularized advice was considered 
to be more fruitful than extensive upfront rules. 
This evaluation was not just based on institutional competence. The 
BBA’s consultation with its constituents led it to think that greater ex ante 
specificity in processes was not to be desired. For example, the settlements 
provide extensive guidance on the content of  the submission, requiring the 
submitting bank to define “reasonable” market size clearly. By contrast, the 
BBA’s report found that seventy-seven percent of  the thirty-one formal 
responses opposed requiring a fixed and clear account of  market size, 
while only one thought that formalizing the question would be helpful.152 
The Wheatley Review came to the same conclusion, declining to stipulate 
what question LIBOR is set to answer, or how precisely firms must do 
so.153 While the settlements are intended to improve LIBOR, they require 
policies that were rejected by the Wheatley Review and the BBA. A 
measured approach is therefore appropriate, especially when the method 
of  applying these requirements is an ad hoc process of  unilateral 
settlements.154  
C. Other Reform Proposals
Transaction-Based Index. Many experts have argued that LIBOR should be
replaced by an index that is based only on genuine transaction data, which 
would be public or publishable if  necessary. The Wheatley Review 
declined to make this recommendation in part because most market 
participants responding to Wheatley said this was not feasible.155 The BBA 
came to the same conclusion.156  
Eliminate LIBOR. Professor Michael Barr, former Assistant Secretary of  
the Treasury for Financial Institutions, has said that LIBOR is unnecessary 
in good markets and untrustworthy in bad markets.157 He has urged 
regulators to push for the transition to a new index. Yet, the Wheatley 
152. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47.
153. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 2.14.
154. See generally Rebecca Tabb & Joseph Grundfest, Alternatives to Libor (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 138, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272462. 
155. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, app. ¶ B.19. Those few participants who
supported it did so with designs for a regulatory subsidy addressing the dearth of transactions. Id. 
app. ¶ B.20 (“for example, by creating special considerations for the inter-bank market, similar to 
market-maker exemptions (e.g. capital relief, more relaxed liquidity rules, etc.)”). 
156. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47, at 4 (stating
that an element of judgment will always be required). 
157. See, e.g., Michael Barr, It’s Time to Take the ‘E’ Out of “LIE-BOR,” YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 17,
2012, 7:46 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/barr-time-e-lie-bor-
234646443.html#more-id. 
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Review concluded that transition to a new index “would pose an 
unacceptably high risk of  significant financial instability, and risk large-
scale litigation . . . .”158 Similar concerns have been expressed by Ben 
Bernanke159 and industry representatives.160  
Any change to LIBOR’s fundamental operations could create 
uncertainty and litigation costs, as some parties may seek to invadidate 
their contracts. These risks are especially high if  the new LIBOR generally 
disadvantages some constituency. While appropriate chain and transition 
rules could prevent an abrupt change in the rate, a clumsy transition to a 
new methodology would result in systematically higher or lower rates, with 
greater or lesser volatility.161 With so many contracts linked to LIBOR — 
subprime mortgages in Alabama, bond issues by the city of  Baltimore, 
Eurodollar futures contracts traded in Chicago, syndicated loans for 
infrastructure projects in Pakistan, and interest rate swaps between 
multinational conglomerates — it is impossible to predict how a new 
LIBOR could affect all of  its users.  
Abrupt or not, some participants want relatively little change to LIBOR. 
They like it for its correlation to bank borrowing costs, and prefer it to 
other rates.162 Market participants have not voted with their feet, even 
though there are other rates available. Despite all of  the negative publicity, 
there is no indication of  a decline in LIBOR use.163  
Government-run LIBOR. Some experts have urged government provision 
of  the LIBOR benchmark or its replacement index.164 It is thought that “a 
158. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 1.12. See also id. app. ¶ B.34 (“Most responses
recommended caution with regards to making significant changes to LIBOR, in case it puts existing 
transactions at risk . . . . There was also a concern that step changes in the rate as a consequence of 
changes to LIBOR may pose legal difficulties.”). 
159. See, e.g., Shahien Nasiripour, US Regulator Calls for Faster Libor Reform, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24,
2012, 7:33 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e617878a-065b-11e2-abdb-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2bOmmDR00 (“‘The problem is that, of course, we have enormous 
amounts of existing contracts, not just derivatives contracts, but a variety of other kinds of loans and 
securities which are based on [LIBOR],’ Mr. Bernanke said. ‘And until those are negotiated away or 
they expire, we have this huge legacy issue of [LIBOR]-based financial contracts.’”). 
160. See, e.g., Brook Masters, Fast Libor Reform ‘Risks Causing Chaos,’ FIN. TIMES, (Sept. 10, 2012,
7:37 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b805fa0a-fb40-11e1-a983-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2U2WSsWYw (citing corporate borrower group and investment 
management associations’ concerns). 
161. See Sarah Lewis, 150 Shades of Libor, FOCUS (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.trinityllp.com/150-
shades-of-libor/ (arguing that reformed LIBOR could lead to higher, more volatile, rates). 
162. See, e.g., Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Will the Wheatley Recommendations Fix LI-
BOR?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Nov. 2012, at 3 (noting that “market participants . . . presuma-
bly have believed that LIBOR was conceptually the best rate to rely on and that it was superior to 
other readily available benchmarks”);; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 40–41 (noting problems 
with other indices); Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40, at 49. 
163. See, e.g., The WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 1.13.
164. Id. app. ¶ B.31. Some of the responses to the Wheatley Review’s initial discussion paper
argued “that the authorities should take ownership of the rate, including rate-setting . . . .” Id. 
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government benchmark would not be vulnerable to the sort of  
manipulation to which LIBOR has been subjected.”165 Yet government 
manipulation of  indices is also possible.166 Indeed, some of  the LIBOR 
manipulation that occurred is alleged to have been at the behest of  
government officials concerned about policy objectives.167 The basis risk 
would be higher for a government-run index unless it was based on the 
same borrowing rates of  the current LIBOR,168 in which case it would face 
the same problems of  insufficient data in thin markets as does LIBOR. In 
any case, parties already have the option to use a government rate if  they 
wish, so it seems unlikely that eliminating a prominent non-governmental 
option would assist parties. At the same time, the Wheatley Review worries 
that a publicly-run LIBOR would not adapt to user needs as quickly as 
does a privately-provided benchmark.169 Wheatley therefore recommended 
against government control of  the index.170 
D. Regulatory Pathologies
Closer scrutiny of  the record of  LIBOR and the BBA during its period
of  putative “deregulation” provides other important lessons for future 
reform. One lesson involves the ways in which public regulators can be 
captured or otherwise rendered powerless. Unsettling evidence has 
suggested that regulators may have known, tacitly approved, or even 
recommended manipulation of  LIBOR to panel banks.  
Some amount of  LIBOR manipulation may have been with the blessing 
of  state regulators. Bob Diamond testified that senior British officials had 
raised concerns that Barclays’ rates were too high and that it would be 
better to lower them.171 In other correspondence, it was suggested that 
Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of  the Bank of  England, may have been 
among the regulators blessing the depressed rate. Diamond carried the 
message to his subordinates. Jerry Del Missier gave the instruction, 
believing that he was following indirect orders from the Bank of  England. 
As The Economist put it, there is “evidence that can be interpreted as an 
implicit nod from the Bank of  England (and Whitehall mandarins)” to 
engage in manipulation “to bolster confidence in banks and keep credit 
165. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 39.
166. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40, at 135–40.
167. See discussion infra Part II.D.
168. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 38.
169. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 3.7.
170. Id. ¶ 1.16.
171. See, e.g., James Chapman & Becky Barrow, Revenge of a Fallen Titan: Ousted Barclays Boss Makes
Damning Claims Bank of England and Labour Ministers Were Involved in Rigging Interest Rates, DAILY MAIL 
ONLINE (last updated July 4, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2168449/Bob-Diamond-resignation-Ousted-Barclays-boss-makes-damning-claims-Bank-England-
Labour-ministers-involved-rigging-rates.html. 
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flowing.”172 The manipulating banks thus may have had “tacit permission 
from their regulators.”173 The impulse behind potential regulatory coopera-
tion in rate manipulation might be understandable as the health of  domes-
tic financial institutions during the financial crisis became intertwined with 
the survival of  the real economy. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of  New York was informed — perhaps in 
April 2008,174 perhaps in August of  2007175 — that Barclays was 
underestimating its rates. This resulted in a June 2008 email to Merwyn 
King, Governor of  the Bank of  England, from U.S. Secretary of  the 
Treasury Tim Geithner. The ten-point recommendations included in the 
email were essentially copied from the BBA’s own proposal, meaning that 
the government’s only regulatory response was to adopt a regulation from 
industry. Those proposals ended up being forwarded back to the BBA.176 
That proposal went nowhere, with U.K. officials denying that they had 
even received such notice.177 
These disturbing possibilities of  regulatory involvement in the provision 
of  inaccurate borrowing quotes for LIBOR suggest that in order to be 
effective, future public regulation of  LIBOR may need to be cordoned off  
from political interests. This underscores the importance of  recognizing 
the risks of  public index provision.178 Viewing the BBA as a regulator also 
allows one to see it as a captured regulator, entirely too tolerant of  the 
banks it supervised. This, again, reminds us of  the importance and 
difficulty of  protecting public regulators from industry capture.  
Regulators of  all stripes make mistakes, and our attention must be 
focused on how to help them make better decisions. Jon Macey opined 
that “regulators foolishly looked to [LIBOR] to determine the market’s 
perception of  the health of  big banks.”179 Will they make the same mistake 
172. How Britain’s Rate-Fixing Scandal Might Spread — And What to Do About It, ECONOMIST (July
7, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558260. 
173. Id.
174. Libor Talks Go Back to Early ’08, WALL ST. J. (last updated July 14, 2012, 3:06 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303919504577524510853665528.html. 
175. See, e.g., Rachelle Younglai & Pedro da Costa, Geithner Says Did All He Could to Address Libor 
Problem, CHI. TRIB. (July 26, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-26/news/sns-rt-us-
usa-geithnerbre86o0vc-20120725_1_libor-responsibility-for-market-manipulation-british-bankers-
association. 




177. See, e.g., Mark Scott, Bank of England Chief Denies New York Fed Gave Warning on Rate-Rigging,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (last updated July 17, 2012, 8:05 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/bank-of-england-chief-denies-n-y-fed-gave-warning-on-
rate-rigging/?scp=2&sq=bank%20of%20england&st=Search. 
178. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40.
179. Jonathan Macey, Libor: Three Scandals in One, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 20, 2012), available at
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if  given greater control over this space? Will more frequent meetings and 
more formalistic procedures increase unjustified confidence? Abrantes-
Metz and Sokol argue that the LIBOR manipulation was easy to detect: 
“Had any member bank that set [LIBOR] or any antitrust authority 
undertaken an econometric screen, they likely would have detected these 
anomalies . . . .”180 What causes regulators to decline to use these screens, 
just as the BBA and its members did, if  they can be so effective?  
E. The Limits of  Private Regulation
Private regulation failed in the OTC space because of  steps private
regulators chose not to take. However, among those omissions were 
actions that the private regulators could not have effectuated. While a private 
regulator can create advantageous circumstances for those who conform 
to best practices or standardized ways of  doing business, such a regulator 
may have difficulty preventing free-riders from taking advantage of  the 
system to which others contribute. For instance, a transnational private 
regulator will have little ability to create and enforce intellectual property 
regimes. 
For example, the LIBOR banks incur significant costs to contribute to 
the rate. Other banks and entities enjoy the use of  a widely-known rate, 
but they may not end up paying for it. A private regulator has only limited 
powers of  exclusion over information. ISDA, for example, provides that 
its agreements are valid only when printed on paper purchased from 
ISDA. Whether this self-destruction language actually proves effective, 
ISDA has found a cumbersome way at least to imply that unauthorized 
users do not enjoy full benefits.  
The BBA can delay access to LIBOR data, but cannot effectively 
exclude non-paying users given the state of  intellectual property in many 
nations. Without the ability to internalize much of  its users’ gains, 
incentives are skewed for actors subject primarily to transnational private 
regulators.181 Sometimes the solution may be to allow the transnational 
private regulators some limited power over the provision of  intellectual 
property. More often, state actors must focus on those regulatory powers 
that they are unwilling to delegate to the private regulator. 
Further, the LIBOR incident may be “too big to litigate,” because even 
the panel banks — many of  the world’s largest and most important 
financial institutions — may not have pockets deep enough to actually 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137789/jonathan-macey/libor-three-scandals-in-one. 
180. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from Libor for Detection and Deterrence of
Cartel Wrongdoings, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 11 (2012), http://www.hblr.org/2012/10/the-
lessons-from-libor-for-detection-and-deterrence-of-cartel-wrongdoing/.  
181. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40.
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compensate victims for the sums of  money that inappropriately changed 
hands if  misleading submissions dramatically altered the LIBOR rates. The 
structure of  “too big to litigate” exists within the OTC derivatives market, 
at least in part because the central private regulators — ISDA and the 
BBA — produce valuable intellectual property that structures market 
transactions (through documentation and reference rates, respectively) as 
something like public goods. As a result, neither of  these organizations, 
nor the major commercial entities that inform their output, fully 
internalize anything like the profit stream that their intellectual property 
could make available. A difficulty results: the production of  intellectual 
property as a public service means that there may not be sufficient funds 
available to hold culprits accountable if  misuse occurs.182 
Besides the odd problem of  the world’s biggest banks potentially being 
judgment-proof  because LIBOR was largely provided for free, this 
combination of  private regulatory production of  public goods has its own 
particular hazards.  
All of  the products offered by ISDA — its ubiquitous documentation, 
legislative efforts, or Credit Derivatives Committees — are produced 
through a particular kind of  information production, which we have called 
byproduction elsewhere.183 Information is byproduced when it is produced 
as an incident to some other profit-generating activity.184 For instance, the 
New York Mercantile Exchange creates the NYMEX financial index and 
the financial participants on ISDA’s influential committees draft ISDA’s 
documentation, but neither corporate entity’s principal motivation is the 
production of  that information.185 Rather, derivatives markets participants 
182. These structural features of ISDA documentation and LIBOR are discussed in far greater
detail elsewhere. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40. Stephen Bainbridge has addressed the 
analysis of intellectual property and incentives therein with some subtlety, but also with several 
errors. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 45–50. For instance, Bainbridge misses that producers of 
financial intellectual property will need property protection from wherever their fees principally 
accrue. Bainbridge also fails to recognize that the value of the intellectual property of LIBOR and 
ISDA documentation could quickly grow stale and useless in the absence of adequate incentives. 
Unlike a static piece of intellectual property, such as a book or patent, most financial intellectual 
property is iteratively produced and dynamic, and outdated information can be worse than useless. 
That intellectual property reform should be supplemented by other reforms — in the LIBOR context 
or elsewhere — is something that we never deny. 
183. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40, at 135–40.
184. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law
Production (Ill. Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research, Research Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884985 (distinguishing production and byproduction); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Private Lawdrafting, Intellectual Property, and Public Laws (George Mason 
Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-20, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986455. 
185. See, e.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 118 (2d
Cir. 2007) (discussing incidental production of information by NYMEX). 
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serve on ISDA’s committees in order to assist in creating the financial 
infrastructure that enables efficient transacting.  
Byproduction has two features that promote the likelihood of  
byproducts serving as public goods. The first is conceptual: a byproduct is 
not designed by its creators as a principal profit-making instrument. The 
second is its corollary: because a byproduct is an incident to some other-
directed commercial activity, it is typically low-cost to its producers. For 
both of  these reasons, byproducts will often be provided to third parties as 
a public good.  
Related to these benefits, however, are several structural features of  
byproduction that make it especially prone to certain regulatory failures. 
Byproducts often employ private internal firm data (hence, their status as 
byproducts), making misuse or manipulation of  that data more difficult to 
detect. Byproducts are, by definition, not a primary firm income generator, 
and sometimes will not be significant income producers at all. If  so, then 
the incentive to maintain the byproduct’s quality and reputation — an 
incentive that can dilute manipulative impulses — will be absent. Finally, 
and most importantly, like any form of  joint production,186 byproducts are 
generated alongside some other product, and creators may have a conflict 
of  interest if  the byproduct can impact the primary product’s success. 
Byproduction of  harmonized regulation can often be an efficient way 
for markets to be governed, and private regulators can often produce it 
efficiently. However, this mode suffers from structural limitations, both in 
terms of  incentives and powers. While awareness of  private regulation can 
often relieve the state of  regulatory burdens, the state’s interventions may 
be doubly important where private regulation is unlikely to work well.  
F. Assessing the Desirability of  Regulatory Abdication
LIBOR manipulation may have created an inefficient distribution of
wealth during the period of  improper quote provision.187 Beyond simply 
wreaking havoc in the absence of  regulation, an unregulated LIBOR may 
have also frustrated government regulation intended to improve the 
economy in the early days of  the Great Recession. In December 2007, the 
Bank of  England cut the base rate fifty basis points to 5.5%. LIBOR fell 
by only four basis points. As the senior technical manager of  one of  
England’s largest mortgage brokers put it, “The rate cut has not had the 
usual reaction in the market.”188 One possible explanation for the 
unresponsiveness could be that monetary policy efforts — intended to 
186. See generally M. Ishaq Nadiri, Joint Production, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 1028 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). 
187. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 9.
188. Tanya Powley, Libor Stays High Despite Rate Cut, MONEY MKTG., Dec. 13, 2007, at 5.
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lower rates to borrowers, improve liquidity, and stimulate the economy —
were undermined by false submissions.  
Yet, willful unresponsiveness to policy levers implies that the BBA or 
LIBOR banks had the power to use LIBOR to affect monetary policy by 
contributing to perceptions of  the direction of  short-term interest rates, 
the target of  the Bank of  England’s policy move. This is consistent with 
the prior discussion that the state may have delegated some amount of  
control over interest rates to the BBA.189 It may be that LIBOR, in taking 
on a monetary policy function from the state, has done more than allow 
for interest rate protection. 
Consider one problem during the financial crisis and how LIBOR might 
have been involved: the inability to reduce principal or interest payments 
to mortgage borrowers. Many borrowers owned homes that were “under 
water,” and hence worth less than their indebtedness. For such borrowers, 
it could be rational to default on the loan. For others, the home equity 
exceeded liability, but they found monthly payments to be untenable. This 
may have been due to illness or unemployment. Alternatively, they may 
have been in the practice of  obtaining loans with a teaser rate and then 
refinancing, but when such refinancing had become unavailable, their 
monthly payments increased to an unaffordable level.  
Many experts have argued that borrower and lender alike would benefit 
from a modification under these circumstances, but modifications were 
surprisingly rare. Explanations for this scarcity are many. Securitization of  
loans meant that the initial lender, the loan servicer, and the entity entitled 
to payment from the borrower were unlikely to be the same entity, raising 
the complexity of  modification. The loan servicers, those best positioned 
to effect modifications, may have been afraid of  liability to owners of  the 
loan for modifications adverse to their interests. It would have been 
difficult and costly to obtain broad agreement amongst the owners of  
various tranches of  mortgage-backed securities (MBS), whose interests 
were often adverse. Even where agreement or waiver could be cheaply 
obtained, loan servicers sometimes had little incentive to propose a 
workout since they also received payments for their work in addressing 
defaulted mortgages. Likewise, it would be difficult for a consortium of  
owners of  the reference loan to actively monitor its servicer, allowing the 
agent a great deal of  discretion. Those coordination problems concern the 
intra-security conflicts attendant to a single mortgage-backed security, but 
the entire pool of  mortgage-backed security owners may have had their 
own coordination problem. With each defaulted mortgage, home values 
nearby plummet and other mortgage-backed securities are endangered. 
MBS investors, as a class, might have benefited if  each had taken steps to 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 108–09.
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modify loans in consideration of  the benefit to other MBS investors. But 
absent some mutual commitment, few investors would take account of  
this positive externality.  
Finally, many owners of  mortgage-backed securities would dislike a 
modification or writedown even if  it resulted in fewer costly defaults. Such 
modifications could designate the security as delinquent in payment, and 
thus subject to credit downgrading. For regulated entities, such credit 
downgrades can have severe impacts, such as triggering a need to raise 
additional capital at a time when capital may not be forthcoming. Such 
entities would prefer a “non-modification modification,” which is precisely 
what LIBOR might have allowed.  
LIBOR manipulation may have helped solve all of  these problems.190 
Under one possible account of  LIBOR manipulation, the contributor 
banks lowered their submissions in order to protect their reputations. If  
this were true, it would have had the effect of  lowering the LIBOR rate. 
This in turn would have lowered the monthly payments and interest 
obligations of  all borrowers linked to LIBOR, which would have included 
the vast majority of  subprime borrowers, those most at risk of  default. 
Thus, successful downward manipulation of  LIBOR could have arguably 
achieved an efficient result from one perspective — overcoming 
transactions costs and agency problems, as well as easing the stress on 
borrowers precisely when they needed relief. 
To be sure, not every account of  the macro-effect of  downward 
LIBOR manipulation is so glowing. Bainbridge points out that low LIBOR 
rates would fail to compensate lenders for the risks they assumed in 
lending and would cause losses to many mutual funds and hedge funds.191 
This is surely right, at least unless and until margins on the rate adjusted to 
the new norm. But wondering whether this type of  transfer helped or 
harmed the crisis in the long-term is precisely the kind of  question we 
would ask if  the Federal Reserve or a regulator had engaged in similar 
easing or cramdowns. 
These considerations are part of  a broader normative question as to 
whether political institutions should sometimes pressure financial entities 
to engage in behavior that is inefficient or misleading, if  it is perceived to 
have some critical consequence for the economy. The “too big to fail” 
debate may have an intriguing and analogous phenomenon in the world of  
financial infrastructure: LIBOR may be “too big to end” and “too big to 
regulate” simply because its essential importance as a sign of  health for a 
190. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 9 (stating that “the misreporting of the LIBOR da-
ta may actually have made the banking crisis worse in the long term”). See also Rosa M. Abrantes-
Metz et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 893, 897–99 (2011); Rauterberg & 
Verstein, supra note 40, at 104 (discussing harms of LIBOR manipulation). 
191. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 9.
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nation’s banks compromises the capacity of  public regulators to govern it 
objectively and demand accuracy at all times.  
G. Market Spaces Without Public or Private Regulation
In light of  private regulation, the OTC derivatives market cannot be
accurately described as unregulated. Indeed, even in terms of  state 
regulation, the market has long been subject to important forms of  
oversight and accountability at the entity level. In fact, the vast majority of  
swaps dealers are regulated at the entity level as either banks or financial 
firms.192 
There are financial markets that come close to being genuinely 
unregulated — subject to no robust rules of  conduct in certain respects — 
and they look very different from the OTC derivatives markets. 
Appreciating the real, if  limited, role of  private regulation highlights the 
unique character of  those markets that have no public, private, or mixed 
regulation. One interesting example is insider trading in the commodities 
markets. In the commodities markets, insider trading is, for most purposes, 
legal. “In contrast to the broad prohibition against insider trading found in 
the securities laws, insider trading is considered an accepted and integral 
practice in the commodity futures and derivatives markets.”193 While there 
are perfunctory gestures at adopting different private norms,194 the 
commodities markets simply do not have a domestic or transnational 
192. See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of Derivative 
Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1994) (indicating, at that time, more than ninety 
percent of the top fifty entities dealing in interest rate swaps were banks, financial firms, or affiliates 
already subject to regulation); Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. and Inv. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 11 (July 9, 2008) (statement of Katherine E. Dick, 
Deputy Comptroller for Credit & Market Risk, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), available 
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-79a.pdf (noting that “the vast majority of significant 
participants in these markets are regulated”). Additionally, OTC swap transactions remained subject 
to antifraud provisions. See, e.g., EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 14.05 (10th ed. 2013); see also 
Governance, supra note 104 (“As all contributor banks are regulated, they are responsible to their regu-
lators, rather than BBA LIBOR Ltd. or the LPBAUG, for maintaining appropriate procedures for 
contributing.”). 
193. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common 
Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151, 167 (2011) (“Not only does 
the Commodity Exchange Act (the ‘CEA’) lack a prohibition against insider trading in commodities 
(except with respect to certain individuals connected with the regulation, self-regulation, or exchange 
governance of those markets), but the CEA actually accepts insider trading as a means to facilitate 
efficient pricing of commodities.”). Front running certainly is illegal, but importantly, it does not 
encompass anything like the full range of activities prohibited by insider trading laws in the equities 
markets. 
194. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION (June 2010), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf. The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Core Principles prohibits insider trading. 
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private body that effectively enforces an additional set of  rules. This 
unregulated aspect of  the commodities markets highlights their basic 
economic functions: 
[T]he purpose of  the commodity futures and derivatives markets is
to provide a forum for price discovery and risk management . . .
[and] as a joint report by the SEC and CFTC acknowledges, ‘permit
hedgers to use their non-public material information to protect
themselves against risks to their commodity positions.’ . . . ‘it would
defeat the market’s basic economic function — the hedging of
risk — to question whether trading on knowledge of  one's own
position were permissible.’195
Different trading markets can serve dramatically different functions and 
be served by different rules. While domestic equity markets with broad 
societal participation may benefit from a regulatory prohibition against the 
use of  insider information, other markets, like the commodity futures 
markets, exist in part to enable insiders to express their knowledge in trad-
ing strategies.196 Recognizing the significant differences between a market 
without governmental regulation and one bereft of  any regulation 
whatsoever may well have a valuable lesson to teach as to the function of  
the unregulated activity for that market. 
H. The Domesticity of  Transnational Private Regulators
Transnational private regulation can only outrun the state so far.
Ultimately, even a transnational private regulator must be subject to at least 
one (and potentially many) public regulatory regimes. This “home” or 
domiciliary of  the private regulator will often have its status solely as the 
result of  historical contingency, rather than as the result of  conscious 
choice by the regulated, third parties, or coordination by international 
governments. Nonetheless, the law of  this home state will have a 
tremendously outsized power over what is now a truly transnational 
regulatory regime. LIBOR provides a compelling example of  this concept. 
The Wheatley Review may be a largely reasonable set of  
recommendations, but the power of  the report and subsequent action by 
the British government illustrate our structural observation. LIBOR is the 
195. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 193, at 168; see also Elizabeth L. Ritter, The Securitization of Com-
modities: Crossing a Gold (or Silver) Line in the Sand, 2 BUS. L. BRIEF 7, 8 (2005) (“‘insider trading’ means 
something very different in the securities world than it means in the commodities world (where it's 
actually desirable to have people with inside industry knowledge actively trading the marketplace — 
that's how prices are discovered). Consequently, application of securities insider trading laws to 
commodities trading is entirely inappropriate.”). 
196. See, e.g., Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 193, at 168 (explaining that “commodity futures and
derivatives markets exist to facilitate trading based on information generated by participants’ inside 
knowledge”). 
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world’s short-term interest rate benchmark, and the LIBOR contributor 
banks include over half  of  the world’s systemically important financial 
institutions, less than one-quarter of  which are based in the United 
Kingdom.197 The United Kingdom also accounts for less than half  of  the 
overall market value of  global OTC derivatives.198 Yet, it is the British 
government that retains the right to reformulate LIBOR, eliminate the 
BBA’s control over it, and potentially (and disastrously) end LIBOR itself. 
By accident of  history, the U.K. government could have abolished the 
world’s most prominent interest rate and thrown millions of  contracts into 
disarray. 
However, exercising this leverage over international financial markets is 
risky. OTC derivatives markets are localized in London and New York,199 
and Bainbridge has claimed that aggressive control over LIBOR by the 
U.K. Treasury or Bank of  England would meet with “political hostility” in 
the United States.200 
From the perspective of  the state under whose jurisdiction a 
transnational private regulator is headquartered, unique possibilities 
emerge. This jurisdictional reach provides a state with legal and regulatory 
power over a transnational private regulator. Control over the home of  a 
transnational private regulator is thus a largely unacknowledged source of  
international regulatory power. A nation that seeks a certain character of  
regulation for the world’s derivatives markets may well find that its best 
chance of  achieving harmonized international regulation of  that market is 
through leveraging control over a transnational private regulator.  
Professor Robert Wai has characterized the broader reality of  which this 
is just one instance — the necessity of  even transnational private entities 
being subject to some measure of  public jurisdiction — as the 
“touchdown” of  transnational business, which seems to have partially 
“lifted off ” from the plane of  easy state law governance.201 Wai cogently 
outlines several points of  touchdown for private entities, including 
utilization of  domestic law regimes to enforce contracts and property 
rights effectively, such as intellectual property or e-commerce.202 The 
necessity of  some “touchdown” entails that a public regulator will always 
197. About Us, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bba.org.uk/about-us/member-list (last visited Aug. 6,
2013). 
198. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting from Dodd–Frank
Derivatives Regulation, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 249, 259 (2012). 
199. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1321.
200. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 40. Indeed, Bainbridge explicitly worries about “the
thorny question of which government would take the lead.” Id. 
201. Biggins, supra note 54, at 1316; Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The
Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
209, 265 (2002). 
202. Wai, supra note 201, at 265–66.
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be able to assert power over financial markets principally regulated by a 
transnational private regulator. Likewise, Wai makes the point that these 
“touchdown” points are public regulators’ opportunity to ensure that 
transnational private entities (and private regulators) are fully responsive to 
third-party concerns.203 
John Biggins has drawn on Wai in the context of  ISDA, noting “despite 
the best efforts of  ISDA and the industry to minimize ‘interpretative 
interference’ through what I term ‘targeted touchdown’ . . . in what are 
perceived to be ‘derivatives friendly’ jurisdictions, particularly England and 
New York, such interference has been unavoidable.”204 Biggins emphasizes 
the potential hazards of  public interference in transnational private 
regulation. 
To our suggestion that LIBOR might be bolstered by U.S. property law, 
Bainbridge says  
[i]n the case of  LIBOR, however, this suggestion makes no
sense . . . . While the U.S. government obviously has an interest in 
such a globally and systemically important benchmark . . . it 
nevertheless makes more sense for any new intellectual property 
protections to come from LIBOR’s home base rather than the 
U.S.205  
Chris Brummer has expressed a similar view: 
ultimately the LIBOR scandal is an instance where the UK appears 
to be the most responsible authority since the British Bankers’ 
Association, a local organization, provided the unique product in 
question . . . . London’s Financial Services Authority was not a host, 
but was instead, for all practical purposes, the home regulator.206 
This domestic power allows states to influence, shirk, and avoid 
responsibility for either. Brummer is right that: “[t]he home regulator 
won’t get off  scot-free [if  there is a problem for the host country], but it 
will escape a lot of  the scrutiny.”207  
The regulator with the greatest power to affect the transnational private 
regulation regime may sometimes have the least incentive to do so. If  the 
home state is the beneficiary of  the current transnational private regulator, 
then there is an incentive to allow its misbehavior at the expense of  others. 
Thus, the Federal Reserve of  New York may fail to curtail LIBOR 
203. Id.
204. Biggins, supra note 54, at 1298.
205. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 47.
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manipulation insofar as the beneficiaries are New York banks and the 
losers are global swap participants.  
The global reach of  regulation is exemplified by aspects of  UBS’s 
LIBOR settlement with the CFTC and the U.K. Financial Services 
Authority.208 In that case, a U.S. regulator dictated to a Swiss Bank how its 
Japanese affiliate would communicate with a U.K. trade organization in 
connection with a benchmark used around the world. Thus, the 
substantive oversight of  the benchmark-setting process is often achieved 
on a firm-by-firm basis, rather than at a national or industry level, where 
regulators have traditionally had power over the relevant firms.  
I. Noticing Harmony
ISDA and the BBA have achieved massive harmonization of  global
derivatives norms. Realizing that there is non-state harmonization reveals 
the possibility that increased harmonization of  state regulation may come 
at the expense of  extant private regulatory harmony. It is an open question 
in any given instance whether that increased harmonization will result in a 
net increase in regulatory harmonization. For example, Dodd–Frank’s 
efforts to create regulatory order has diverted transactions from better-
harmonized spaces to less-harmonized ones. Under Dodd–Frank, many 
more OTC swaps must be cleared at registered clearinghouses, and entities 
that clear swaps through a Derivatives Clearing Organization must be 
registered Futures Commission Merchants.209 Cleared swaps rely on 
futures account agreements rather than ISDA documentation, a fact that 
has resulted in some surprise and confusion to firms familiar with global 
swaps practice.210 These changes resulted in a fragmentation of  the 
practical order. This disharmony has since been managed by private 
regulators.211 But policymakers must be aware that efforts to increase state 
regulatory harmony, even when they succeed on their own terms, may 
decrease harmonization simpliciter.  
208. See, e.g., UBS AG & UBS Sec. Japan Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,481 (Dec. 19,
2012) (order instituting proceedings pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act making findings and imposing remedial sanctions), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfub
sorder121912.pdf. 
209. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 724a, 124 Stat. 1376, 1682 (2010).
210. See, e.g., Lauren Teigland-Hunt, When Worlds Collide: An Overview of New Industry Documentation 
for Cleared Swaps, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2012, at 1. 
211. Id. at 5. FIA and ISDA published a standard form addendum to futures clearing agreements
to address cleared swaps. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ambition of  this Article was to explore the implications of  a 
change in perspective on global derivatives regulation. The stage was set by 
reviewing the scholarly literature that recognizes authoritative governance 
of  market activity, which is produced by private actors, as a genuine form 
of  regulation. We then analyzed the BBA and ISDA as transnational 
private regulators that have produced coordinated, pervasive, and 
harmonizing norms for OTC derivatives. We suggested that this picture is 
more accurate than the history of  OTC derivatives that has often been 
promoted in the media and scholarly literature, in which OTC derivatives 
were seen as subject to virtually no regulation at all. From this perspective, 
we articulated the many implications for future regulatory reform, 
including recognizing preexisting regulatory harmony, appreciating the 
extent to which trade-offs involved in regulatory proposals have already 
been considered, and muting the urge to willy-nilly regulate in times of  
crisis. With these tools, there can be modest hope for superior future 
governance of  OTC derivatives.  
